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1Summary
Western Europe has an extensive industry of policy research institutes. The first
wave of these ‘think tanks’ emerged in the late nineteenth century in countries such as
Great Britain and Germany.  The most extensive growth occurred in a second wave of
development in most European countries after World War Two.  These institutes were
often large technocratic institutes with a professional, in-house research staff and usually
benefited from extensive state support. A third wave of organisational development from
the late 1970s brought diversification, specialisation, more apparent normative agendas
and stronger advocacy of policy analysis. Many of the new institutes are smaller in size
and contract external researchers. A nascent fourth wave of think tank
transnationalisation is unfolding.
The policy influence of these organisations is multi-faceted. They contribute
broad ideas and frameworks of policy thinking; they have become essential to data
construction, information gathering and dissemination; and among civil societies
they  play  a  role  in  raising  public  awareness. Many of these organisations are
recognised policy actors in their own right rather than simply being ‘informers’ of
policy on the outside of decision-making. In particular, networks are important
mechanism for feeding policy analysis into policy development, especially in
milieu characterised by multi-level governance. However, the preponderance of
policy analysis organisations does not necessarily lead to improved policy
formation or effective knowledge utilization.
Institutes face a number of challenges today and in the future. The most
critical challenge for many is shortage of funding. Whilst there are numerous
sources of funding – government, the EU, international organisations, private
foundations, corporations – competition is stiff.  Moreover, policy fashions change
and donor organisations develop new funding priorities that may spell hardship,
and sometimes closure, for think tanks without a broad base of funding support.
The use of information communication technology is increasing the transparency of
think tanks, extending their public outreach, broadening their audiences and
potential membership.   In future, accountability, participation and representation in
policy research may become more pressing concerns for think tank managers.
2Introduction
In  this  paper  we  discuss  the  roles,  diversity,  country  differences  and  influence  of
public policy institutes and think tanks in Western Europe with special attention to the
European  Union  (EU)  context.  Discussion  of  think  tanks  was  once  limited  almost
exclusively to Anglo-American systems.1  However, policy institutes in the EU have
come under greater scrutiny (see inter alia, Day, 2000; Ladi, 2002; Sherrington, 2000)
and  we  draw  extensively  on  this  body  of  literature.  In  addition,  current  research  is
increasingly focused on think tank development in the developing world (see chapters in
McGann & Weaver, 2000) and post communist transition countries (see Struyk, 1999;
Goodwin & Nacht, 1995; Quigley, 1997; Krastev, 2000).
These studies come in the wake not only of an explosion of think tank numbers but
also in response to increasing activity of other organisations seeking policy advice and
promoting think tank growth. Private foundations, corporations and other non-state actors
are demanding high quality research, policy analysis and ideological argumentation.
Governments and international organisations like the United Nations often regard think
tanks  as  a  means  to  extend  policy  analytic  capacities,  aid  civil  society  development  or
promote human capital development (ODC, 1999). Our appendix of selected policy
research institutes with a social science orientation is not comprehensive but does provide
some indication of the extent and diversity of institute development throughout Western
Europe.  However, our purpose here is to provide more of a conceptual analysis of the
development, roles and influence of policy research institutes/think tanks, than to provide
a descriptive map of organisational development.
In Part One, we provide an overview of the think tank landscape in Western Europe
and their periodic waves of institutional development. We outline some of the definitions
of think tank and policy institute and how understanding of these terms can differ
substantially from one political culture to another. In addition we provide a typology to
guide some of our discussion. We argue that:
? There have been successive waves of think tank development over time
throughout most European countries with trends from generalist to specialist
focus, and from technocratic styles of institute activity to more advocacy,
increasing competition.
? Policy analysis organisations – private and governmental – have consolidated,
diversified and matured to produce collectively a strong, sophisticated and
extensive policy analysis industry.
? Given the vast diversity of policy institute structures, research objectives, size
and  ambit,  we  claim  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  a  'typical'  profile  of  a
European policy research institute or think tank.
? Growth of the organisations undertaking policy research – whether they be
private or public – is likely to continue.
1   Some of the best known studies include: Abelson, 1996, 2002; Cockett, 1994; Denham, 1996; Dickson,
1971; Ricci, 1993; Smith, 1991; Stone, 1996; Weiss, 1992.
3In  Part  Two,  we  address  the  policy  process  and  knowledge  utilisation  with  a
specific focus on: firstly, how European institutes bridge research and policy;
secondly, issues of political independence, scholarly autonomy and policy
credibility; and thirdly, the development of think tank networks, research centre
cooperation and institutional linkages to governments and other official policy
actors.  Addressing questions about modes of think tank influence and relevance,
we argue:
? Many of these organisations are recognised policy actors in their own right
rather than simply being ‘informers’ of policy on the outside of decision-
making.
? Policy impact is multi-dimensional. For example:
- Contributing ideas and frameworks of thinking
- Data construction, information gathering and dissemination
- Raising public awareness.
? Different tactics are employed by institutes/think tanks to disseminate analysis,
communicate with decision-makers, bridge research and policy. In other words,
while advocacy and punditry has become commonplace it has not supplanted
more traditional and scholarly modes of analysis and publication.
? Networks are important mechanism for feeding policy analysis into policy
development, and policy networks will be become a more common feature of
policy development characterised by multi-level governance.
? However, the preponderance of policy analysis organisations does not
necessarily lead to improved policy formation or effective knowledge
utilization.
 In  Part  Three,  we  focus  on  the  demand  side  of  utilization  of  think  tanks'
intellectual capacity, as well as their financial linkages and sustainability in the
market for policy analysis.  We identify a number of issues that institutes face today
and in the future.
? There are many challenges facing think tanks, the most critical of which for
many is shortage of funding.
? There are numerous sources of funding – government, the EU, international
organisations, private foundations, corporations – but competition is stiff.
? Issues of accountability – participation and representation in policy research –
have not been an issue for this industry but may become so in the future.
? The use of information communication technology is increasing the
transparency of think tanks and broadening their audiences and potential
membership.
Methodology
Much of the information in this paper derives from in-depth interviews carried out by
one of the authors (Ullrich) with the directors, researchers and policy analysts of Western
European think tanks, with an emphasis on Brussels-based EU think tanks and German
and UK EU-oriented think tanks. The locations were chosen in order to highlight the
4diversity that exists among think tanks within Western Europe.  Additionally, to gain a
more balanced view, government policymakers, the primary consumers of think tank
output, were also interviewed including officials within the European institutions as well
as member state civil servants based both in Brussels and in their respective capitals.  The
other author (Stone) has been a participant-observer of a number of policy research
institutes. She has been a member of various institutes, a consultant to the World Bank in
its think tank capacity building programs and more recently a member of governing
bodies of both European university research institutes and independent think tanks as
well as the Global Development Network.
5Part One: Overview of Policy Research and Analysis
Organisations
Definitions
Think tanks and public policy institutes vary considerably in size, structure, policy
ambit and significance. As a consequence of this diversity, there are considerable
difficulties in defining 'think tank'. While it is often the case that ‘think tank’ is used
interchangeably with ‘policy institute’, it is not always appropriate.  A ‘policy institute’ is
the broader generic category concerned with the functions of policy analysis and
research. This activity may be undertaken within a private, third sector or governmental
context. For most of the last century, the term ‘think tank’ was associated with a
particular kind of organisational entity with legal status as a non-profit organisation
predominant in the USA and Westminster political systems such as the UK, Australia and
Canada. This cannot be assumed in the European context where the label ‘think tank’ has
been applied to many official and quasi-official bodies.
The Anglo-American understanding of think tanks is of relatively autonomous
organisations engaged in the generation of ideas and/or the analysis of policy issues
independently of government, political parties and pressure groups.  It is a ‘relative
autonomy’ as think tanks are often in resource dependent relationships with these
organisations. Funding may come from government sources but think tanks attempt to
maintain their research freedom and at least claim not to be beholden to any specific
interest.  Nonetheless,  'think  tank'  is  a  slippery  term.  It  has  been  applied  haphazardly  to
any organisation undertaking policy related, technical or scientific research and analysis.
Such organisations may operate within government (this is evident in the case of the
Group of Policy Advisors within the European Commission). They may be found within
academic institutions (such as the Constitution Unit in the School of Public Policy at
University College London).  Often they are independent non-profit organisations while a
few are attached to a profit making corporate entity.
As think tanks have proliferated in other regions, the think tank concept has been
stretched. While the term ‘think tank’ has often been adopted in its English wording, with
all its cultural connotations (Krastev, 2000), it has been applied to government research
units that lack autonomy from political interests. There has been conceptual stretching of
the term in France. As Fieschi and Gaffney argue, “in the French case, the main difficulty
in defining think tanks lies in the relationship between think tanks and the state/policy
sphere given that the line between intellectual, or at least a particular type of intellectual,
and politician is blurred” (2003: 3)
Given the complex multi-level policy-making environment of the EU, it may be
argued that rather than seeking to develop an all-encompassing definition, perhaps more
critical to gaining an understanding of European think tanks is defining their role in the
policy process.  According to EU think tank researchers and government officials, this
can be characterised as follows:
6“Firstly, to develop ideas for the policy agenda for about two years
down the line [since] there is a need to take up the issues of today and then
link them with the future.  Secondly, to promote intelligent ideas.  Thirdly,
to pull policy-makers away from the here and now and get them to see the
implications and deeper meanings of issues” (Interview with member state
official.  Brussels.  March 2001).
“To provide independent analysis and policy options” (Interview with
think tank director. Brussels, January 2001)
“Think tanks act as facilitators or catalysts [within the EU policy
process].  They also bring together those who would not have any other
occasion to come together. These include academics, civil servants,
associations and lobbyists, civil society organizations and non-governmental
organizations…A broad field of people who are working in the same field,
but have different perspectives” (Interview with an official in the European
institutions. Brussels.  January 2001).
Taken together, these comments produce constructive defining characteristics that
provide a useful basis for analysing the large variety of think tanks operating within the
EU policy environment.
Think tanks or policy institutes need to have some kind of engagement with
government if they are to succeed in influencing policy.  However, their desire to
preserve intellectual autonomy means that most institutes try to strike a delicate balance
between dependence on government and total isolation from it.  The precise nature of
'independence' is to be treated with flexibility.  While many institutes discussed in this
paper are private organisations, the degree of independence of these organisations varies
across at least three dimensions:
1. Legal independence
2. Financial independence
3. Scholarly independence.
Legal independence might  be  said  to  derive  from  status  as  a  private  organisation
outside the state apparatus. That is, established as a commercial entity but more often as a
charity or non-profit organisation. Despite independence as a private organisation, some
of the organisations may be said to have resigned their autonomy to government, a
political  party  or  a  corporation.   (Examples  include  the  Commission’s  Group of  Policy
Advisors and the former Philip Morris Institute in Brussels.)  However, the notion that a
think tank or policy institute requires independence or autonomy from the state in order
to be 'free-thinking' is a peculiar Anglo-American predilection that does not travel well
into other cultures (as noted earlier in relation to France).
A number of think tanks are dependent on a single funding source whether it be
governmental or private.  Accordingly, financial independence could be construed as
7developing an endowment or having numerous sponsors and a diverse funding base, so
that an organisation is not dependent on any one, or few, benefactors. We return to this
theme in Part Three.
Scholarly independence is  a  different  concept,  and  reliant  upon  certain  practices
within an institute: for example, the processes of peer review and a commitment to open
inquiry rather than directed research.  The scope for critical analysis and freedom to
determine research agendas is frequently deemed essential to democratic participation in
public debate.
Cultural understandings of independence, the degree of research autonomy and the
extent of interest in policy and political issues, varies dramatically not only from country
to country but from one institute to another.
Are these definitional and labelling dilemmas of any practical concern for policy
analysis organisations? We think so.  As more and more organisations claim to be ‘think
tanks’, the meaning of the term is de-stabilised and potential the value or currency of this
term debased. Given that its etymology is associated with some of the most prestigious
US  research  institutions  (such  as  RAND,  the  Council  on  Foreign  Relations,  the
Brookings Institution and the Carnegie Endowment) this term was associated with a
discrete set of organisations identifiable with high quality research and sound analysis.
Band-wagoning on this (primarily American) heritage of excellence, it was fashionable to
be called a ‘think tank’, especially in the 1990s. Indeed, the term is well established in the
policy lexicon.
Yet, the adoption of this term around the world has seen it applied to organisations
lacking the research capacity and intellectual strength of the older Anglo-American
tradition. That is, bodies more directed to advocacy without a solid foundation of
research, to organisations designed to promote the political interests of directors and
advance the careers of staff (‘vanity tanks’), as well as to organisations in policy practice
(‘think-and-do-tanks’) or capacity building. In short, the term has been stretched. Whilst
many think tanks maintain professional standards and research excellence, the
increasingly diverse kinds of organisations encompassed under this umbrella term
undermine its caché.   Accordingly, directors of institutes may find reasons in future to
distance themselves from this label.
Waves of Development
Think tank development across nations is very uneven. At the end of the 20th
century, in excess of 1200 think tanks are estimated to have emerged in the USA
(Hellebust, 1997). They are relatively few in number in European countries.  American
analysts often argue that the US system is more open, pluralistic and permeable than
European political systems.  They often assume (inter alia, Polsby, 1983; Weaver, 1989)
that there are fewer opportunities for think tanks to enter the policy fray in Europe and
elsewhere due to factors such as stronger party systems, corporatist modes of decision-
making, strong and relatively closed bureaucracies, or weak philanthropic sectors.
8Such assumptions about the ‘exceptionalism’ of American political structures and
institutions should not be taken entirely at face value. There has been a think tank boom
in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  (CEE)  as  well  as  in  Asia  suggesting  that  other  political
systems provide fertile conditions for their proliferation and abundance.2  Nevertheless,
the strength of US policy research industry in comparison to Europe needs to be
observed:
Although the European Union has a larger economy, the US has 30 per
cent more internationally recognised think-tanks - that is, research
institutes composed of scholars and scientists with academic, government
and/or private experience. Most of such centres in both Europe and the US
are independent (80 per cent in the US and nearly 70 per cent in Europe).
A handful are university and government affiliated but otherwise
independent. Moreover, the total number of researchers and the budgets
for each are also higher in the US. The 82 internationally recognised
think-tanks in the US had a total budget of $1.2 bn last year for 8,500
staff. Their 58 European counterparts employed 4,400 people and received
$300m (Kim & Mauborgne, 2001).
Nevertheless, Western Europe is typified by a mature industry for public policy
research and analysis. Previous studies of think tank development identify in most
countries a pattern of ‘waves of think tank development’. Such waves of development
will vary from country to country but each appears to bring increasing diversity. Later
generations tend to be more advocacy oriented, partisan or ideological.
In Britain, the first wave of development occurred in the late 19th century up until
the onset of World War Two. In this country, policy analysis institutes outside of
government (eg, Chatham House/RIIA, the National Institute of Economic and Social
Research – NIESR, the Fabian Society) were scholarly in style and generalist in focus.
They produced substantive, book length publications. Some like the Royal Institute for
Defence Studies (RUSI) had close and comfortable relations with the civil service. With
fewer numbers of institutes, the first wave was also apparent in Germany (Deutsches
Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung – DIW in 1925; the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in 1925;
Institut für Weltwirtshaft Kiel – IfW in 1914; and HWWA Institut für
Wirstshaftsforschung in 1908), Sweden (Industriens Utredningsinstitut in 1939;
Kojunkturinstutet – KI in 1937; Utrikespolitiska Institutet – SIIA in 1938) and Austria
(Österreichisches Institut für Wistschaftsforschung – WIFO in 1927).  However,
institutes were far fewer in number and sometimes of more informal ‘society’, ‘salon’, or
‘association’ structure than Anglo-American counterparts.3
2  Indeed, independent policy institutes are often perceived by young professionals in Central and Eastern
Europe as a more viable vehicle for personal advancement than a career in decimated public sectors.
3  Institutes were also relatively prevalent in the Dominions of the British Empire. Data is taken from an
international directory of think tanks (Day, 1993).
9The second wave throughout many Western European countries took place from
1945  until  roughly  the  late  1970s.  It  is  the  period  when  some  of  the  most  well  known
continental European institutes emerged. This was a period of massive growth of policy
research and analysis capacity both inside and outside government, spurred by
government funding (see next section). Institutes tended to be technocratic in style and
remained relatively elite institutions where staff were highly educated and/or technically
qualified.  In  common  with  the  first  wave,  there  remained  a  heavy  emphasis  on
pragmatism, non-partisanship and objective analysis.
They fell into two broad groupings: those institutes focused on the gamut of
domestic policy (inter alia bodies such as Political and Economic Planning  - PEP) in the
UK (changed to the Policy Studies Institute - PSI) in 1978 and institutes addressing
foreign  policy,  defense  and  security  or  questions  of  development  (for  example,  the
Austrian Institute for International Affairs in 1978; and the Norwegian Institute of
International affairs, established via an act of parliament in 1959). In other words, there
were signs of specialisation.  However, institutes in this period tended to be quite large
institutions with permanent in-house research staff and their product remained relatively
scholarly in tone. Both types were state-centric in orientation; that is, with a strong
national identity.  Notwithstanding the international reputation of bodies like the Institut
Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI), and Clingendael in the Netherlands, their
product was directed to national policy communities.
The third wave has been over the last two decades and has brought a proliferation
of independent think tanks throughout the world.  There are a number of features that are
distinctive to the third wave. Specialisation of policy focus became much more
pronounced with an abundance of environmental think tanks (the Öko Institut in
Germany and the French, Belgian and British Institutes of European Environmental
Policy dating from 1990), peace studies centers (like the Copenhagen Peace Research
Institute - Center for Freds- og Konfliktforskning established  1984 in Denmark), labour
policy institutes (the European Centre for Work and Society, 1979 in the Netherlands) or
centres for the study of monetary policy.
Another important feature was the ideological positioning of many of the new
institutes with forthright normative agendas. However, this tendency was more
pronounced in some countries (like Britain and France) than others (Germany). The so-
called  New  Right  think  tanks  (inter alia,  the  Adam  Smith  Institute  in  the  UK;  Timbro
1978 in Sweden; Libertas Denmark 1983) are the most obvious example of ideological
institutes that started to be founded from the late 1970s.
Alongside increasing partisanship and value driven policy analysis came
increasingly diverse styles of operation.  Many (but not all) of the new institutes, adopted
a more adversarial approach to the marketing of their analysis with more overt advocacy
in an attempt to bridge research and policy.  With advances in communication
technology,  many  of  these  institutes  were  able  to  project  themselves  to  an  extent  that
often  belied  their  often  smaller,  more  compact  size.  The  diversity  of  policy  outlook  in
many countries heralded a competition in ideas between institutes that was not so obvious
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in the earlier waves when there were fewer, larger organisations. However, while
competition among think tanks within European countries increased, there was also an
increase in collaboration among think tanks located in various European countries.
While competition from other policy analysts poses a challenge to European think
tanks, increased competition among European think tanks may result in improvements in
their output.  Even within the relatively limited Brussels market for think tanks working
on EU issues, competition was widely seen as a positive factor.  According to one senior
think tank researcher: “Competition is healthy.  It allows us to focus” (Interview;
Brussels: 29 January 2001.
An additional and much stronger potential source of competition for traditionally-
organised think tanks and policy institutes is coming from universities.  As increasing
numbers of European universities have had to look beyond the security of state financing
to  secure  research  funds,  many  have  set  up  specialised  research  centres,  often  with  a
strong policy focus.   However, given the similar nature of their work, these university-
based research institutes increasingly collaborate with each other or with other think
tanks on specific research projects.   Collaboration among EU institutes indicates that
there is widespread awareness of the benefits deriving from such relationships.  In future,
this collaboration is likely to expand given limited resources among individual European
think tanks as well as the planned enlargement of the EU.
These trends are necessarily very broad brush in a paper such as this one and there
are obviously exceptions to our general claims. Between European countries, there are
significant differences as to when the first wave of development occurred. The
emergence and diversification of policy research organisations started at later dates in
Greece, for example, which has a smaller population of think tanks (such as recently
established Research Institute for European and american Studies -- REIS).In Britain,
Germany and Austria, the three waves begin from the late 1800s.  In most other European
countries, these waves are a post world war two phenomenon. However, the third wave
of development is a dynamic throughout Europe. Needless to say, in CEE, the first wave
of independent policy institutes was only evident after 1989.
A fourth wave appears to be emerging, and to which we give substantive
treatment in this paper. Policy analysis organisations are expanding their research
interests beyond the confines of the nation-state. We suspect that this trend is more
observable among the independent think tanks given their potential for greater autonomy
in this regard than internal government policy research units that may be tied, to a greater
extent, to the dictates of national decision-making. The trend is towards a regional and
global remit, and in Europe, towards the EU.
Within Western Europe, there has been a significant increase in the number of
think tanks focusing on EU policy issues since the early 1990s.  They now cover a wide
spectrum of European policy issues, ranging from broad questions of institutional reform
and enlargement to much more specific topics such as financial regulation and the
creation of a single market for European advertisers.     The growth in EU-oriented think
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tank activity may be seen as a response to both the deepening and widening of the EU
itself and the corresponding increase in the quantity and complexity of policy-making
activities at the EU and member-state level.  As the policy environment expands in scope
and demands on government policy-makers in terms of time and expertise become
greater, there is an increasing need for specialist knowledge, new ideas and policy
alternatives.
Additionally, the rise in the number of EU-oriented think tanks may be seen as
part of the more widespread phenomenon of increased policy-relevant activity by non-
state actors witnessed since the start of the 1990s.  In the EU, the trend of increased non-
state actor activity was partly a result of the difficulties surrounding the ratification of the
Maastricht Treaty between 1992 and 1993 and the acknowledged need for greater
transparency in policy-making.  Recognizing a need to incorporate the views of citizens
to reduce the perceived democratic deficit within the EU political system, Western
European politicians and bureaucrats have encouraged the increased involvement of non-
state actors.
The EU’s relatively transparent and open policy-making process provides think
tanks with potentially numerous targets for their research and ideas.  Sherrington (2000:
175) notes that: “Given the multi-level nature of EU policy-making, there are also a
variety of access points, or target audiences for think tanks…Consequently, there is a
much wider constituency for think tanks at the EU level.”  This broad constituency is a
primary reason for the burgeoning scale and diversity of EU-oriented think tank activity
in recent years.
Forces behind waves of development
For  the  first  wave  of  development,  the  emergence  of  complex  societies  –  that  is,
industrialisation, urbanisation, increasing levels of literacy and education, the maturation
of young democracies, the growth of middle classes and the development of mass media
– provided fertile conditions for the emergence of independent institutes. Lack of
capacity in government to undertake extensive social science investigation and policy
analysis in what were then much smaller bureaucracies, as well as increasing awareness
amongst educated and growing middle classes generated demand for knowledge to aid
modernisation. The post World War Two era of social and economic reconstruction
witnessed the expansion of the public sectors of most European countries, Keynesian
macro-economic policy and a broad social democratic consensus that generated even
further demand for policy and analysis to support new policy experiments. In more
general terms, as governments and international organisations seek to tackle the
seemingly intractable problems of, amongst other things, poverty, pollution, terrorism
and insecurity, there will be demand for ideas and analysis to better comprehend and
respond with appropriate policy.
One thesis that may partially explain the development of think tanks emphasises the
spread of democracy, often in tandem with economic development. Certainly,
independent institutes seem to be more prevalent in industrially advanced democratic
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polities.  The  argument  is  that  they  contribute  to  more  plural  and  open  societies  by
promoting a diversity of political analysis and policy opinion. This could easily lead to
the inference that think tanks are symptomatic of democratisation and national prosperity.
A  diversity  of  organisations  –  none  of  which  has  a  monopoly  on  policy  advice  –
strengthens the democratic functioning of society by educating the populace and
providing another forum for political debate and participation. Comparative examination,
however, suggests that there is no simple correlation (see chapters in Stone and Denham,
2003).
 A further proposition regarding think tank growth concerns government 'overload'
and the increasing complexity of decision-making processes.  In this view, institute
growth is indicative of a need for more information, analysis and advice as economies
and societies become more complex. Big government, globalisation and the flood of
information from interest groups, industry and new government programmes mean that
think tanks become one source of expertise able to explain the nature, causes and likely
remedies of problems.
There is demand also for information to be managed.  International organisations
and governments require organisations to sift and edit knowledge as well as translate the
abstract modeling and dense theoretical concepts characteristic of contemporary social
science. Think tanks and policy institutes represent a legitimate and neutral vehicle to
filter, to make sense of the conflicting evidence, sets of argument and information
overload.  The 'politics of credibility' -- of status, trust and reputation -- is an important
dimension of demand for think tank services in the "information age" (Keohane and Nye,
1998).
... to understand the effect of free information on power, one must first
understand the paradox of plenty.  A plenitude of information leads to a
poverty of attention.  Attention becomes a scarce resource, and those who can
distinguish valuable signals from white noise gain power.  Editors, filters,
interpreters and cue-givers become more in demand, and this is a source of
power.  There will be an imperfect market for evaluators.  Brand names and
the  ability  to  bestow  an  international  seal  of  approval  will  become  more
important (Keohane and Nye 1998, 89).
‘Think tank’ is one such brand name. The massive proliferation of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and other non-state actors, their networks and dense
patterns of exchange along with their advocacy and policy demands are creating
congestion  --  the  so-called  'paradox of  plenty'.  Think  tanks  can  set  themselves  apart  as
credible 'filters and interpreters' of information.
For governments concerned about ‘evidence-based policy’, policy research
organisations potentially help create a more ‘rational’ or better informed policy process
(Dror, 1984). This harkens back to the policy sciences in which some writers identify an
ideal ‘rational-comprehensive model of decision-making. The model is ‘rational’ in the
sense that it follows a logical and ordered sequence of policy-making phases. It is
‘comprehensive’ in the sense that it canvases, assesses and compares all options,
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calculating all the social, political and economic costs and benefits of a public policy. The
central  principle  is  the  collection  and  analysis  of  all  data.  This  is  intended  to  provide
policy-makers with certainty. Extensive communication and consultation is required, and
because policy-making is construed of as ‘problem-solving’, ‘expert’ participation
becomes necessary. The role of the researcher (or policy analyst) is to research and
present all policy options.
However, this model assumes that researchers have both time and access to full
information, and that this information will allow the best policy option to be identified.
Knowledge is seen as neutral or apolitical, and consequently technocracy and cliques of
‘experts’ can emerge. This model also assumes that decision-makers will be persuaded by
the most accurate or scientifically plausible option. However, the aims of policy-makers
are often limited to satisfying immediate public demands, not to maximising long-term
social gains. Rather than searching out all policy alternatives, research often stops as soon
as a workable option is identified. Furthermore, the combination of ‘sunk costs’ in
existing policies, the cost (time and resources) of compiling and assessing information,
and the (generally) poor predictive capacity of (social) science result in less than
‘comprehensive’ outcomes from the policy-making process. Notwithstanding such
limitations, institutes and think tanks (particularly the government sponsored institutes set
up in the 1950s and 1960s) often adopt a public image or identity that stresses their
problem solving and technocratic abilities.
 Rather than organisations for 'rational' knowledge utilisation in policy, think tank
development is also indicative of the politicisation of knowledge. Instead of research and
analysis being used to help decision makers choose among policy choices, it can be used
ex post facto to  legitimate  pre-determined  policy  (see  Part  2).  In  a  few  countries  think
tanks are a means of career advancement or a stepping-stone for the politically ambitious.
The ‘revolving-door’ of individuals moving between executive appointment and think
tanks, law firms or universities is increasingly seen in CEE countries. Denham and
Garnett (2003) argue that this has led to the ‘hollowing out’ of British think tanks.
Another  thesis  of  the  recent  spread  of  think  tanks  is  that  a  long-  term  process  of
convergence has taken place.  That is, the creation of policy research institutes is
indicative of national intellectual and decision-making elites copying each other
(particularly those of the USA – see Krastev 2000; Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000). Within an
international context the American think tank form is often taken as a template for think
tank development elsewhere.  Mimicry occurs when founders in other countries say they
want  to  establish  a  Brookings-style  institution  in  their  own  country.   There  is  some
evidence to support this explanation for think tank dispersion. The Atlas Foundation and
the Mont Pelerin Society have been an important funding organisation and intellectual
society respectively that have supported libertarian and free market institutes around the
world. Organisational transfer has also been fuelled by individuals trained in other
educational systems who have gained familiarity with the think tank form and
occasionally a desire to replicate them in their countries of origin.
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 While  the  convergence  argument  has  some  purchase,  it  does  not  explain  the
development  of  all  institutes.    Many  bodies  emerge  as  the  result  of  initiatives  and
dynamics within, rather than outside, the host country. Moreover, institutes are
irrevocably shaped by the need to find or create their own policy niche and funding
sources.  Rather than mimicry, a range of organisational forms, styles and practices have
emerged across nations. National political cultures and institutional arrangements
strongly  determine  the  type  of  think  tank  that  takes  root  and  the  character  of  its  policy
involvement.
 In many instances, the heightened activity of think tanks appears to be related to
periods of economic and political instability.  The rise of the so-called ‘New Right’ think
tanks illustrates this point as their emergence coincided with a crisis in the Keynesian
paradigm in policy making. Accession to the European Union prompts new
organisational growth.  The Cold War and the more recent War on Terrorism stimulated
the growth of security studies institutes and the reorientation of research agendas.  This
suggests that ‘waves of policy analytic development’ in a particular country do not occur
in a linear fashion but in response to significant societal, economic and political
transformations.
Finally, beyond the nation-state, there are strong signs of think tank adaptation and
evolution that may pre-figure a further wave of think tank development and
diversification. The activities of international organisations such as the United Nations
agencies, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) have drawn think tanks into their ambit. Other policy stakeholders
(civil society, NGOs) are increasingly global. The European Union provides yet another
institutional forum for think tank activity with the emergence of EU wide think tanks
disengaged from specific national identities.  Furthermore, with the revolution in
information and communication technology, the possibilities for policy research
disconnected from specific organisational settings has become increasingly feasible and
fashionable. Most think tanks have a virtual presence (see Appendix: List of Selected
Western European think tanks) and international research exchange and cross-national
collaboration between think tanks is common place. The European Policy Institutes
Network (EPIN – http://www.epin.org) and the European-Mediterranean Study
Commission (EuroMeSco - http://www.euromesco.org/euromesco/matriz.asp) network of
Euro-Mediterranean foreign policy institutes are good examples.
Political Culture and Institutional Architecture
There are significant differences in the organisational characteristics of think tanks
between countries.  Different institutional and cultural environments affect think tank
modes of operation and their capacity or opportunity for policy input and influence.
Oppressive regimes can severely limit the realm of ‘safe’ policy inquiry and
investigation.4   All EU nations have established democratic traditions and practices with
4 In Egypt, for instance, international attention has been drawn to the forced closure of the Ibn Khaldoun
Centre and imprisonment of four of its scholars.
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tolerant political cultures where freedom of speech is recognised. However, the way in
which policy research and analysis is (or is not) incorporated into policy is modulated by
the political culture of a nation and channelled by the institutional architecture of the
state. The following discussion simply highlights some of these factors as it is beyond the
scope  of  this  paper  to  provide  a  detailed  cross-country  analysis  of  institutional  and
cultural variables.
Federalism: A federal structure of government may aid the extent of development.
Federal systems supposedly provide more points for political contact into which think
tanks can target their activities. This is true of the Länder in Germany. In unitary systems,
however, there is a stronger focus of institutes on national government that is often
matched by a geographical concentration of these organisations in the capital cities of
London, Paris and Athens.  Today, we also see a concentration in other centres of power;
that is, in Brussels with institutes drawn in by the centrifugal forces of the EU.
Parliamentary and Presidential systems: A presidential system with checks-and-
balances between executive and legislature supposedly provides interstices through
which think tanks can seek influence. As a broad generalisation, the separation of powers
has a tendency to create relatively autonomous agencies that are often staffed by political
appointees. In such an institutional context, appointees might want to cultivate their own
sources of advice and analysis and either patronise independent think tanks or build in-
house research capacity. However, the degree of institutional permeability to outside
sources of policy analysis as in the US presidential system has not yet been witnessed to
the same extent in European countries (see Weaver & Stares, 2001).
By contrast, parliamentary systems are said to involve greater centralization of
fused executive-legislative power and accountability, supposedly allowing for greater
political control over policy and exclusion of external policy actors.  Furthermore,
political parties in parliamentary systems (especially those with a ‘first past the post’
electoral system) tend to be more cohesive and disciplined and ‘crowd out’ opportunities
for policy influence by research institutes outside government. Nevertheless, political
institutions of national leadership are only one factor in determining opportunities for
policy institutes: a combination of other factors can be more significant.
Political Parties: There is no evidence that think tanks are more likely to develop
further within multi-party systems contributing to coalition government (as in Germany
or Italy) or in strong two-party systems which alternate in office (as in Britain). The link
with political parties is clearly central to understanding the role of think tanks in
Germany.  In other countries, such as Italy, the ties to political parties are less formal and
substantial.
Bureaucratic traditions: Government appointees are more apparent in presidential
systems. By contrast, in Britain a permanent civil service dominates as a source of policy
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advice. Similarly, a permanent career civil service in Germany has traditionally been
suspicious of too much dependence on external sources of policy advice (Thunert, 2001:
158). Yet, over the past two decades there seems to be a tendency towards drawing upon
external sources of advice, possibly in response to what is seen as the 'rubber stamp' role
of parliaments, or a reaction against the civil service view or pensée unique.  Thus, the
'closed' nature of these systems can be overstated.
Cultural and Historical Dynamics: Additional variables for understanding the
diversity of styles of research advisory bodies and the different dispositions of policy
experts between countries lie in the legacy of history and political culture.  In France, the
‘public intellectual’ is a well recognised figure. In Germany, “the technocratic ideal of
‘non-ideological  pragmatism’”  associated  with  the  consensus  politics  around  the  social
state in the post war era “…can also be attributed to the exceptionally strong scholarly
disposition (Wissenschaftlichkeit) that can be found among many policy experts”.
Moreover, “to have a sharp partisan or ideological profile is seen neither as desirable nor
as an advantage in the policy advice market”  (Thunert, 2001: 159).  Likewise, in CEE
and the Soviet Union, a highly technical, scientific and pragmatic approach prevailed in
the large institutes (see Sandle, 2003). Notwithstanding a massive influx of third wave
institutes in the former Soviet Union (fSU) and CEE, traditional norms of scientific
distance from the policy domain persist.
Tax Regimes and Philanthropic Traditions: Crucial to the viability of many
private sector institutes is their tax status (see Part 3., below).
Towards a typology of policy institutes in Europe
 Western European think tanks share many defining characteristics but also vary in
their methods of operation, size, sources of funding, target audiences and the political
environments in which they operate.  Given this diversity of characteristics and contexts,
it  is  useful  to  place  them  within  a  typology  to  provide  a  framework  for  analysis.   The
typology developed here identifies four categories of Western European think tanks:  (For
a similar broader-based typology, see McGann & Weaver; 2000).
1) Policy institutes connected with regional or international organisations.
For  example,  the  EU’s  internal  think  tank  -  The  Group  of  Policy
Advisors (GPA), widely known by its French name, Cellule de
prospective, operates within the European Commission to provide both
expert policy advice to the President of the Commission and his
cabinet and provide a link with external research institutes and
associations.   This category also includes policy institutes within
European- based international organizations such as the Organisation
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and the World Health
Organisation (WHO).
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2) Brussels-based EU think tanks The handful of Brussels-based EU
think tanks differ in at least two important respects from their member-
state counterparts.  First, their location in the heartland of EU activity
gives  the  former  more  frequent  access  to  both  EU  and  visiting
member-state officials.  Secondly, their independence from any
member-state government means that they are relatively immune from
the influence of national political and policy agendas, which may in
turn enhance their credibility at the EU level.
3) EU  Member  State  think  tanks   This  category  includes  numerous  EU
Member State think tanks with varying objectives and distinctive
methods of operation due to the nature of their particular domestic
political system.  There are several variable elements amongst
European think tanks based in member states. First, although this
category of think tank often reflects the political and policy-making
environments  in  which  they  operate,  some  are  clearly  affiliated  to
national political parties. This is particularly true in Germany in the
case of party institutes including the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and the
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.  Secondly, EU member-state think tanks vary
in the amount of time they devote to broader European or EU issues as
opposed to purely domestic issues.  Thirdly, Western European think
tanks vary in accordance with their geographical location.  A
researcher familiar with both UK and continental think tanks observed
that in general, “continental think tanks are typically more academic in
nature, while UK think tanks are frequently based on youth, dynamism
and innovation”(Interview. January 2001).  As Day (2000: 104) notes,
while think tanks in the UK tend to resemble their US counterparts in
terms of structure, there is “definitional blurring” when one considers
think tanks across Western Europe as a whole.
Continental think tanks may be divided into categories according to
their primary activities.  Those focused on research and generating
ideas include the Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI)
in France; the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik (DGAP)
and Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Germany; the Instituut
voor Internationale Betrekkingen Clingendael (Clingendael Institute)
in the Netherlands; the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign
Policy (ELIAMEP) in Greece and the Instituto Juan March de
Estudios e Investigaciones in Spain.  Organisations primarily involved
in policy-oriented analysis for a specific constituency include the
European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA) in Maastricht and
the WEU Institute for Security Studies in Paris.  Aiming to further
debate on European issues are Jacques Delors’s Notre Europe,
DGAP’s Forum on European Foreign Policy, the outreach
programmes of the Bertelsmann Stiftung including its extensive
conference network, international forum and European summer
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school, and Germany’s party-affiliated institutes such as the
Friedreich-Ebert Stiftung and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.
4) University-based Western European research institutes - University-
based Western European research institutes carry out policy-relevant
research, publications, and conference activities. These major
university-based Western European research institutes, while
cherishing and claiming their independence in terms of research, often
collaborate with each other or with other think tanks on specific
research projects.  Thus, a mutually beneficial relationship is formed.
Examples of such research institutes include the Robert Schuman
Centre at the European University Institute (EUI), the European
Institute at the London School of Economics (LSE), the Centre for
Applied Policy Research in Munich and the Mannheim Centre for
European Social Research.
While typologies serve as an analytical tool, some caution is warranted in their
interpretation.  This is particularly so in the case of Western Europe, given both the
multi-level and multi-dimensional nature of the policy-making environment.  Even within
the  categories  of  this  typology,  significant  differences  in  objectives  are  evident.   These
differences, most apparent among the Brussels-based and member state EU-oriented
think tanks, may be divided into three main groups reflecting their primary functions: 1)
generating ideas; 2) policy-oriented analysis and outreach and 3) furthering debate.
Figure 1 positions selected Western European think tanks within these three categories of
activity.
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Figure 1: Selected Western European Think Tanks: A Typology
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Part 2: The Policy Process and Knowledge Utilisation
Traditionally, policymaking has been deemed the preserve of national and sub-
national (local, regional or canton) government. Consequently, ‘policy knowledge’ has
been produced by scholarly communities that are constituted at the nation-state level and
their  analyses  delivered  to  domestic  audiences.  Attempts  by  scholarly  communities  and
policy researchers to inform policy are limited by time and funding, so activities have
tended to focus on what is perceived as the crucial decision making level. In the past, and
still  so  today,  this  is  at  the  level  of  national  government.  Only  when  regional  or  local
governments have significant powers (as in a federal system) will they attract the
attention of researchers and policy entrepreneurs (defined as “advocates for proposals or
for the prominence of an idea” (Kingdon; 1995: 122-123). Today, however, policy advice
comes from experts, analysts and consultants who transcend borders and operate in an
international marketplace of ideas
As  the  earlier  discussion  suggests,  the  policy  process  is  taken  to  be  a  multi-level
one. The trend toward multi-level governance complicates and extends the national
policy scenario. Multi-level governance can be defined as:
 “An arrangement where there is significant institutional development at both
national and supranational levels, and where politicians, bureaucrats and civil
society actors engage in a multitude of cooperative working arrangements
that cross levels” (Coleman and Perl; 1999: 701)
Peterson (1995) has developed a widely-used model of multilevel governance
within the EU policy environment (see Figure 2). Given their policy shaping role, think
tanks and policy institutes are placed within the sub-systemic level. Multilevel
governance is useful in explaining the stage and timing that the ideas and policy
alternatives that Western European think tanks feed into the multi-dimenisional EU
policy process. Policy actors including experts, national government bureaucrats and
senior  government  officials  all  add  to  the  EU policy  debate.  As  the  CEE countries  join
the EU, this model is likely to find application in think tanks and policy institutes in these
states.
Beyond the EU, the role of non-state and (quasi-)-official policy institutes in
international organisations and multilateral initiatives (such as the ‘global public policy
networks discussed below) gives a stronger sense of how policy processes are layered
and overlap at different levels.  In this more demanding policy context, the skills and
strategies of institute staff need to become more sophisticated in order to effectively
engage with political debates and interact with epistemic and policy communities as well
as knowledge and policy networks at multiple levels.
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Figure 2
Multi-level EU Decision-Making
_____________________________________________________________________
Level Type of Decision Dominant Actors    Rationality Best Model
Super- History-making Euro. Council; Nat. Political/ Macro
systemic Governments in legalistic Theories
IGCs; ECJ
Systemic Policy-setting Council of Ministers; Political/ New Institu-
                                                COREPER                   technocratic     ionalism
Sub-systemic/ Policy-shaping             Commission; Technocratic;  Policy
meso-level                                           Committees;            Consensual      Networks
            Council groups; Administrative
Think tanks and
Research institutes
________________________________________________________________________
(Source: Adapted from Peterson; 1995: 71 and 84)
One of the most effective mechanisms through which think tanks have become
transnational is via networks.  An important distinction needs to be made here between
policy networks and knowledge networks.  Knowledge networks of think tanks are
composed of organisations with shared perspectives, joint intellectual interests and
common scholarly agendas, ‘homogenous rather than heterogeneous in their fundamental
views’ (Struyk, 2002: 83). An example might be the members of the European Policy
Institutes Network.  By contrast, policy networks are more heterogeneous and designed to
mediate between members with differing interests in the policy process. Networks are
discussed in greater detail below; however, there are a number of other strategies
deployed by institutes to disseminate their ideas.
Bridging Research and Policy
In some policy communities, there are increased pressures for the social utility of
knowledge production to be demonstrated. Governments, foundations, international
organisations and other donors that fund or otherwise sponsor research and analysis as a
public good, are also under pressure to be accountable for funding allocations.  These
institutions need to demonstrate to themselves as well as to their wider constituencies
(electorates, member governments, memberships, boards of trustees, etc.) that the policy
research they support has impact and is useful to society and economy.
Given the scale of policy institute development throughout Europe and the diversity
of their activity, advocacy and publication, a valid assumption might be that knowledge is
being put to continuous policy use.  This is not necessarily the case. More often than not,
decision makers are unaware of relevant policy analysis, even analysis within their
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internal government research units. Yet, it is also the case that many policy analysts are
unconcerned with dissemination and marketing of their research, sometimes operating
under the false assumption that the results or data or evidence will ‘speak for itself’. Both
researchers and policy-makers might be accused of holding unrealistic expectations of the
other. That is, researchers often consider that there is no political audience for their work
despite the important observations they make and policy relevant explanations they
develop. By contrast, policy-makers often consider that what researchers contribute is not
relevant, too esoteric and asking theoretical questions that do not resonate with the needs
of policy makers.  Where the one group feels nobody listens, the other feels their opposite
numbers have little to say.
A number of independent think tanks have sponsored studies into how they might
improve their interactions with decision makers and their impact upon policy.  Notable
examples include the on-going ‘bridging’ programmes of the Overseas Development
Institute (ODI) in London (see: www.odi.ac.uk/) and the Global Development Network
(GDN).5  In the same vein, a report has been published by the International Institute for
Environment and Development (IIED) (Garret and Islam, 1998).  Similarly some
government agencies have also undertaken analysis to raise awareness among recipients
of  research  funds  of  routes  to  knowledge  utilisation.  Official  bodies  such  as  the
Netherlands Development Assistance Research Council (RAWOO; 2001), the Swiss
Commission for Partnerships with Developing Countries (KFPE; 2001), the Department
for International Development (DfiD, 2002) in the UK, and the Danish Agency for
Development Assistance (Danida, 2001) have conducted enquiries into the relationship
between knowledge production and policy development.
This  is  not  a  crass  instrumentalisation  of  knowledge  (as  the  sophistication  of  the
RAWOO, DfID and other reports indicate) but a trend to be expected in polities where
there is policy rhetoric about the ‘knowledge society’ or ‘evidence based policy’. The
future implications for the policy research industry are that funding agencies are
increasingly cognisant of mechanisms and processes for knowledge utilisation and will
be more demanding of think tanks and government policy research units to build into
research design and practice strategies for knowledge utilisation. Those policy
researchers and organisations that adapt to these ‘bridging’ pressures will be in a stronger
position to secure funding and contracts in the market place of ideas.
Strategies of Research Advocacy and Impact
Assuming researchers want to be heard in policy circles, they must identify
problems in the character of the supply of research that hinder its policy utility and devise
techniques that push data, analysis and information into the policy-makers world. Getting
the supply of research into appropriate formats for policy consumption has many
5 Some of the most up-to-date analyses of how policy research can be marketed and the kinds of policy
influence to pursue can be found on the website of the Global Development Network – www.gdnet.org.
Follow the links from its ‘’Bridging Research and Policy’ project to over 90 papers and case-studies.
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ingredients but there is no fail-safe recipe.  However, the various methods that follow
may lead think tank research to have increased policy relevance:
1. Quality:  The  policy  promotion  of  research  need  not,  and  should  not,  come  at  the
expense of quality and standards of scholarly inquiry. Work that is sloppy, inaccurate
or misconceived will be displaced by the research of other more competent groups,
reputations will be damaged and future opportunity squandered.  There are issues of
uneven quality within the policy research industry.
2. Dissemination: One supply problem is the inadequate dissemination of research
results. More often than not, a researcher does not disseminate findings beyond
publication in a scholarly journal with very small readership. There are numerous
secondary routes.  Websites are an obvious location for pre-published work. But there
are many other less academic routes of dissemination: newsletters and magazines;
research reporting services; the media; electronic discussions, etc.
“Outfits such as the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
(CNRS) or the Institut Francais pour les Relation Internationales (IFRI),
who  were  barely  present  on  the  web  four  or  five  years  ago,  have  now
developed extremely sophisticated and informative sites; associations
with  little  financial  resources  have  made  the  most  of  the  web  to  make
their publications available and develop links and hyper-links to other
associations.  This seemingly strictly technological development had …
important consequences.  …, the sites, by presenting links to other think
tanks, political parties, associations and clubs, contribute to the identity
of the relevant think tank itself” (Fieschi and Gaffney; 2003: 1).
3. The ‘Brief Case Test’. The President of the Washington D.C. based Heritage
Foundation once famously accredited some of the influence of his think tank to the
requirement that staff ensure that Heritage ‘policy briefs’ could be carted to Capitol
Hill in one brief-case. These ‘briefs’ are usually less than ten pages, cogent in laying
out a policy problem and explicit with recommendations for reform or action. In other
words, tailoring research into user-friendly format. Research is re-packaged to meet
the specific needs of policy makers: executive summaries; simple and non-technical
language; short and accessible for busy politicians or staffers to read in 15 minutes.
4. Creative Communication: Researchers may be poor advocates. Researchers usually
cannot and often do not want to provide the unequivocal answers of the kind policy-
makers demand. But, the style of presentation and ‘narratives’ that help ‘sell’ research
are very important. ‘Policy entrepreneurs’, people who have a talent for creating
‘narratives’ or story lines that simplify complicated research findings for public
consumption. It makes research distinctive and appealing. Policy entrepreneurs are
‘media savvy’. They have a flair for interpreting and communicating technical or
theoretical work. Usually an entrepreneur is an individual, but sometimes an
organisation such as think tank or a research network plays a similar role in marketing
knowledge or synthesizing and popularizing research.
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5. Public Debate: Research for policy is also research for the recipients of that policy.
Even the most carefully crafted policy initiative, employing the best expertise and
wisdom, is likely to run aground if broader coalitions of popular support and
understanding are not built. Public debate sheds light as to whether a policy option is
politically, economically and socially feasible. Discussion of research in public
forums helps to protect the integrity of research and makes information available for a
wide range of audiences.  In the public eye, researchers have greater control over how
findings are presented – including form, content and venue – helping prevent
distortion of evidence.
6. Serving Policy Maker Demands: A civil servant, politician or agency chief wants
answers to problems as well as recommendations and blue-prints that can be put into
practice to a deadline. They are in a ‘pressure cooker’ environment.  Research needs
to be policy relevant and action oriented. Sometimes they want ‘blue skies’ research
but this will be clearly designated. Some politicians and bureaucrats are innovative
and seek policy concepts and ideas challenging and questioning of the status quo. In
other instances, policy makers are looking for scientific credibility and scholarly
justification to legitimate existing policy preferences. In both choosing their topics
and presenting the results of their research or policy analysis, European think tanks
need to consider the limited time decision-makers have to “indulge” in the material
presented by think tanks. One national decision-maker involved in EU policymaking
stated that “the products of think tanks interest me professionally only when I think
they add real value to my task, either by enhancing my analysis of the issues or
providing an opportunity for promoting agenda change in the direction favored by the
Government I serve” (Interview; Brussels: 2001).
7. Policy process awareness: One reason the supply of research is flawed is due to the
poor policy understanding of researchers about both the policy process and how
research might be relevant to this process. For example, research recommendations
can be impossible to implement if political realities (such as cost-effectiveness,
bureaucratic capacity) are not addressed.  Research will resonate at different stages of
the policy process – during agenda setting or in policy evaluation – and institutes
need to be vigilant in waiting for windows of opportunity.  Similarly, the amount of
original data available in a policy environment/country also plays a role in
determining the type of research a think tank or policy institute should produce. In
environments where there is a lack of basic economic data, there will be a demand for
original  research  that  gathers  and  analyses  such  data  and  presents  it  in  a  way
understandable to policy-makers (Weaver and McGann; 2000: 1). As the policy
environment expands in scope and demands on government policy-makers in terms of
time and expertise become greater, there is an increasing need for policy analysis and
policy alternatives.
8. Target research to key audiences: A principal challenge is to identify key policy
actors who might have an interest in research results. This only results from
understanding the policy process and who are the key actors within a policy
community both inside government as well as outside. The legislature is not always
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the best location to push research; instead, the locus of decision-making may be in a
‘kitchen cabinet’, amongst advisers to ministers, or a cabal of bureaucrats; etc.
9. Networks: Research results are given force and amplified by the collegial recognition
of peers and the weight of scholarly opinion. Knowledge networking activities
(professional associations, academic conferences and specialist newsletters) help
build  a  scientific  consensus  that  decision-makers  can  only  ignore  at  their  own  risk.
(on policy networks see next section)
10. Co-option and Co-operation: “A good way to bridge think tank research and policy
development is for researchers to work with policy actors from the start (of a project).
Then the researchers need to decide how much they want to (take the policy actors’
views) on board” (Interview; London: 13 January 2003). Feeding policy research into
policy deliberation and implementation is more likely when researchers/experts
actively try to follow the research by seeking appointment to official committees or
becoming government advisors.  For impact it is often necessary to provide policy
back-up in the form of policy evaluation and monitoring. Researchers in close contact
with policy makers develop a better understanding of their needs and the political
constraints they face. Additionally, positive interactions can create trust that allows
policy makers to become more open or pre-disposed to new information. In other
words, an institute should consider working closely with key stakeholders inside
government or international agencies. ‘Insider’ status may also provide a unique
vantage to identify critical gaps in knowledge and opportunity to embark upon new
research to help fill these gaps.
The above list assumes a policy audience. However, it must be remembered that there
are wider constituencies for policy analysis in the corporate sector, within social
movements and among NGOs.
Conceptualising Institutional linkages and policy networks
Although the typology offered above provides a useful framework to distinguish
the various types of Western European think tanks, it does not offer significant insight
into the role EU think tanks play in influencing EU policy, specifically within
transnational networks. This requires a conceptual framework. A potentially useful
conceptual model is that of policy networks. Broadly defined, they are “a mode of
governance that incorporates actors from both inside and outside government to facilitate
decision-making and implementation” (Stone and Garnett; 1998: 15).
Policy networks may emerge when certain policy objectives require the exchange
of resources from many different levels of actors.  This is particularly the case when a
policy consists of technical elements or is a new policy area.  However, rather than
simply exchanging resources, policy networks are seen to have other functions.  Van
Waarden outlines these functions:
1) channeling access to decision-making processes;
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2) consultation, or exchange of information;
3) negotiation;
4) coordination of otherwise independent action;
5) cooperation in policy formation, implementation and
legitimization (1992; 33; numbers added).
Policy networks range in their cohesiveness. Policy communities consist of a tight
relationship of policy actors with common views on a specific policy issue.  In contrast,
issue networks are much looser groups who create “webs of influence” around various
policy issues (Heclo; 1978: 102).
Rather than applying only the general notion of policy networks, this paper
suggests applying several of its various components are particularly relevant in
conceptualizing the role of think tanks and policy institutes. These include the concepts
of policy communities, epistemic communities, advocacy coalitions and policy
entrepreneurs. These various groups, (or individuals in the case of policy entrepreneurs),
may be identified as explanatory factors in analysing both the manner in which and the
reasons why a specific policy emerges.
Applying conceptual frameworks to European institutes in this manner offers a
more comprehensive approach with which to explain the role of European think tanks in
the multi-level EU policy environment.  The following section provides a brief
introduction to the various conceptual components as applicable in the case of Western
European think tanks.
Policy Communities: Members of a policy community include a wide range of
policy actors including politicians, civil servants, interest group and non-governmental
organisation representatives as well as recognized experts.  Actors within policy
communities “interact strategically, while engaging in exchanges involving the sharing of
information, expertise, and political support”  (Coleman and Perl; 1999: 696).  Numerous
policy communities consisting of European think tank researchers, national and EU
bureaucrats, politicians, academics and corporate representatives are active within the
wider European policy environment.  Although these various communities often differ in
terms of nationality and specific policy issues, think tanks and policy institutes can
provide a primary domain in which these various policy communities overlap.  Thus,
European think tanks are one factor in the development of a Europe-wide policy
community.  Notably, EU think tank-sponsored forums exclusively for fee paying
corporate members, (referred to by some as ‘new’ policy communities as compared to the
more  traditional  ‘old’  policy  communities  that  involve  a  mix  of  government,  corporate
and citizen representatives) has been described as ‘private diplomacy’ (Interview.
London. February 2001). The increase in new-style policy networks is due to the large
number of mergers across EU member state boundaries encouraging corporate
representatives to become part of a policy community that is not separated along national
lines.
Epistemic Communities: Epistemic communities have been defined as: “a network
of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an
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authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (Haas;
1992: 3).  Epistemic communities are formed when there are conditions of uncertainty in
order to provide expert information on complex technical issues to policy-makers.  In
order for specific epistemic communities to be legitimized within the policy process, their
ideas and policy tools generally need to be accepted as well as used by other policy
actors. Epistemic communities are of specific interest in tracing the development of new
ideas and policy alternatives.
“Epistemic communities require a presence in reputable organisations outside
government such as universities, policy institutes, scientific laboratories and international
organisations  to  cultivate  and  sustain  their  scientific  expertise  and  authority”  (Stone;
1996: 94-95). Thus there is a potential point of intersection between epistemic
communities and think tanks. The existence of epistemic community members is more
likely within think tanks that emphasize the generation of ideas and university-based
European research institutes.  For example, evidence points to the group of natural and
social scientists working in the Institute for European Environmental Policy (IEEP) as
being part of an environmental epistemic community (Sherrington; 2000: 185).
Additionally, the European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes (ENEPRI),
sponsored by CEPS and the London-based Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
with its wide European network of economists exhibit aspects of epistemic communities.
Given that these epistemic communities operate within European think tank and policy
institute networks indicates that within the European policy environment, epistemic
communities may tend to be transnational in nature.
Advocacy Coalitions: Similar to epistemic communities, advocacy coalitions
place a premium on knowledge.  Consisting of a diverse range of policy actors such as
politicians, civil servants, researchers and interest group representatives, advocacy
coalition members “seek to better understand the world within a particular policy area in
order to identify means to achieve their fundamental objectives” (Sabatier; 1993: 33).
The advocacy coalition framework is particularly applicable to explaining policy change.
Confronted with new knowledge and expertise, members of advocacy coalitions may
alter some of their beliefs through a process of policy-oriented learning, thus allowing for
changes to current policies. However, a key distinguishing variable of advocacy
coalitions is the emphasis on the belief system rather than knowledge in itself.  The
beliefs of members guide their actions and shape their ideology and interests.  Thus,
unlike epistemic communities, advocacy coalitions offer a “more overtly political and
value-based” approach to the policy process (Dudley and Richardson; 1996: 69).
Accordingly, this concept may be most appropriately applied to understanding the
activities of the more ideological think tanks. An example might be found in the
Stockholm Network (http://www.stockholm-network.org/) -- a working group of
European market-oriented think-tanks seeking to build a wide network of pro-market
policy specialists within Europe and to use that network to influence the future direction
of European policy-making on issues of pan-European importance.
Policy Entrepreneurs: Kingdon identifies policy entrepreneurs as “advocates for
proposals or for the prominence of an idea” who are particularly noted for “their
willingness to invest their resources – time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money –
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in the hope of a future return…that might come to them in the form of policies of which
they approve, satisfaction from participation, or even personal aggrandizement…” (1995:
122-123). Kingdon continues by explaining the motivation of some identified policy
entrepreneurs: “They enjoy advocacy, they enjoy being at or near the seat of power, they
enjoy  being  part  of  the  action.   They  make  calls,  have  lunch,  write  memos,  and  draft
proposals” not only to promote their own visions or values, but because they “simply like
the game” (Kingdon; 1984: 130).
In the case of the EU policy process, the source of policy entrepreneurs’ influence
derives not only from their expertise in a particular policy field but also from their
intimate knowledge of the EU policy process and access to elite policy communities.
Additionally, the existence of a well-placed and highly-regarded policy entrepreneur
within an advocacy coalition may increase its chances of gaining dominance in the policy
environment. Acting as a policy entrepreneur is generally a choice made by individual
policy actors based on various motivations.  Thus within Europe, they may be active in
the full range of think tanks. The link between policy entrepreneurs and institutes is that
they need an institute’s intellectual vitality and organisational reputation as a public
platform from which to broadcast policy visions with greater credibility.  However, given
that policy entrepreneurs tend to be involved in the policy debate, there may be a greater
likelihood of such actors within think tanks focusing on policy analysis or furthering
debate such as the Brussels-based Friends of Europe and Jacques Delors’ Notre Europe.
Tracking  the  combination  of  these  groups  and  networks,  active  at  various  times  and  to
various degrees at each stage in the policy process is useful for conceptualizing the role
played by European institutes and their staff within the multi-level EU policy-making
environment.
The majority of European think tank researchers interviewed thought that
belonging  to  one  or  more  networks  –  whether  formal  or  informal,  knowledge  based  or
policy focused – was both an objective of their organisation as well as an important
element in promoting the work of their institute. A member of a formal European
network of think tanks was more precise in stating that her organisation aimed to “build
collaborative networks of researchers, policy-makers and business” (Interview; Brussels:
2001).
Through being proactive in seeking out existing networks working in similar policy
areas, think thanks and research institutes are likely to gain a greater awareness of current
policy trends, an increased audience for their research and potentially more funding
prospects. Although collaboration among think tanks across national borders has existed
for some time, recently there have been calls that even within the competitive domestic
environment, think tanks with similar views “should perhaps work more closely together
[in order to] create synergy.” (Interview; London: January 2003).  Such synergy would be
of particular benefit if the think tanks involved spanned the three types of identified
primary functions of think tanks: 1) generating ideas; 2) policy-oriented analysis and
outreach and 3) furthering debate.
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Transnationalisation of policy analysis networks
More frequently institutes are responding to transborder policy problems of
pollution and international movements of finance and human capital by adopting broader
research agendas in recognition of compromised state sovereignty and various processes
of economic and political globalisation. Think tank transnationalisation also parallels the
transnationalisation of academia with its 'invisible colleges' and cross-national research
partnerships (KFPE, 2001). Research staff employed in institutes such as SIPRI
(Stockholm International Policy Research Institute), The Brookings Institution in the US
and Chatham House in the UK are often drawn from an increasingly internationally
mobile community of academics, consultants and other experts.  Indeed, many have a
transnational presence as a consequence of the media – Le Monde Diplomatique, CNN or
the BBC – requiring pundits or ‘talking heads’ to speak authoritatively on matters such as
the war on terrorism or the decay of the ozone layer.
Since the late 1980s, a growing number of institutes have extended their activities
beyond their home states  “The transnational boom in think tank development has been
prompted by foundations, corporations and other non-state actors demanding high quality
research, policy analysis and ideological argumentation. It has been fuelled by grants and
other funding from governments and international organisations seeking to extend policy
analytic capacities, aid civil society development or promote human capital
development” (Stone; 2003: 1).  A few American institutes have opened offices abroad;
for example, the Aspen Institute in France and the Urban Institute in Russia.  Convened
by the Japan Center for International Exchange, Global ThinkNet
(http://www.jcie.or.jp/thinknet/) is a dialogue forum for the heads of some of the world’s
leading think tanks in which to address pressing global issues.
According to one senior think tank researcher, “Whether networks are regional,
international or global dependent on the issues involved” (Interview; London: 13 January
2003).  In the case of the Western Europe, regional networks, both formal and informal,
are forming within and across the categories of the typology as well as with states outside
the EU particularly with applicant countries.  Due to the unique features of the EU policy
environment, including that it is multinational, multilingual and multilevel, policy
networks operating across national borders within Europe and contributing to debates
both in Brussels and member states are particularly important. These networks of
intellectuals take shape through interaction at conferences, collaboration between
European think tanks, international institutions and associations that draw upon national
contributions.  Such transnational networks allow European think tanks to gain broader
perspectives on European issues and, among EU member states, incorporate different
approaches to EU policy issues.
The  Trans  European  Policy  Studies  Association  (TEPSA)  is  an  example  of  an
initially informal network becoming formalized.  Established in 1974 by three Western
European think tanks, TEPSA currently consists of 15 EU member state think tanks and
research institutes as well as six associated members, four of which are located in the
applicant countries.  TEPSA’s aims include the establishment of dialogue between the
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different  nationalities  of  the  EU  as  well  as  developing  a  common  TEPSA  view.
Advantages of belonging to this formal network of particular relevance for national
associations from newer member states or candidate countries, is the assistance of other
TEPSA members in learning the intricacies of the EU policy process and gaining easier
access to EU policy-makers.
A more recent regional network is the European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN)
consisting of 41 policy institutes from in 30 countries across Western and Eastern
Europe.  Among its stated aims are “to promote and develop pan European debate and
understanding” on the most critical issues facing the future of Europe as well as to “act as
a focal point for dialogue with the [European] Convention” (http://www.epin.org/).  Key
strengths  of  EPIN  are  its  ability  to  foster  a  truly  European-wide  network  of  policy
institutes working on common issues as well as to produce analyses of European policies
based on a broad comparison of national research.
Within such European networks, a European ‘policy elite’ has emerged that
facilitates linkages between Brussels-based EU institutions and the national debates
within the individual member states.  Notably, a researcher within a EU-oriented think
tank argued that while historically debates over Europe had been primarily national in
their outlook, due to the increase in think tank networks and collaboration on research
projects, as well as the growing frequency with which European policy actors are meeting
in think tank sponsored forums, a truly European debate could be said to be developing
(Interview, London. February  2001).
Think tanks that are genuinely international are less apparent.  The Trilateral
Commission (http://trilateral.org:9999/) is a policy research organisation that is
transnational in its form of organisation. The Club of Rome
(http://www.clubofrome.org/) and the World Economic Forum based in Davos,
Switzerland (http://www.weforum.org/ may also qualify. Transnationalisation also results
in think tank hybrids  – international policy salons like the elite Evian Group
(www.Eviangroup.org) or research units inside NGOs like Transparency International
(http://www.transparency.org/).
Globalisation is also a phenomenon that has prompted changes in think tank
activity and research agendas (Stone, 2001).  This is evident in three orders.  Firstly, as
the number of think tank publications on globalisation testify, policy institutes/think tanks
are observers and interpreters of globalisation.  Secondly, the changing focus of think
tank  activity  is  symptomatic  of  globalisation.   That  is,  these  organisations  are  both
transnational and (to a lesser extent) globalised in response to the compromised
autonomy of the state, the formation of regional blocs and the more general phenomenon
of non-state actors interacting on the global stage alongside international organisations
and nation-states.  Third, in a small way, institutes are also constitutive of globalisation.
They propel political, social and economic forms of globalisation respectively by
promoting their staff into transnational policy communities, by forming transnational
networks and alliances with other non-state actors, and through policy studies that
advocate or criticise economic forms of global integration.  Many seek to address a
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‘global  audience’,  and  can  be  seen  as  contributing  to  the  emergence  of  global  civil
society.
Think tanks are drawn into ‘global public policy networks’ (or what could also be
called ‘transnational policy communities’ not dissimilar to the national and European
policy communities outlined above). In many issue areas, governments and international
organisations do not have the ability to design and/or implement effective public policies
alone. ‘Global public policy networks’ (GPPNs) – composed of NGOs, government
agencies, business groups and international organisations – are helpful in some issue
areas to come to terms with these challenges (see: www.globalpublicpolicy.net and
www.gppnresearch.org/). The transnational character of policy problems establishes
rationales for research collaboration, sharing of information and co-operation on other
activities that creates a dynamic for the international diffusion of ideas and policy
transfer.
Examples of well-known GPPNs include the World Commission on Dams, the
Global Reporting Initiative, the Roll Back Malaria Initiative, the Campaign to Ban
Landmines, the Forest Stewardship Council, Transparency International, and the Apparel
Industry Partnership. A more research based example, is the World Bank sponsored
Global Development Network (GDN - www.gdnet.org) a world-wide network of
university centres, think tanks and institutes with a shared interest in promoting, as a
global public good, policy research on economic development. The Western European
hub is based in Bonn (www.eudn.org/), another in Moscow (www.eerc.ru/) and a further
hub in Prague (www.cerge-ei.cz). Collectively, they help connect researchers with
decision-makers in national, regional and international organisations.
Think tank prominence at a global or regional level is often reflective of the extent
of their consolidation in their home country.  Transnational institutes still require a strong
domestic constituency and local sources of sustenance. Transnational activity requires
finance, leadership skills and vision as well as expert personnel to carry the organisation
forward into regional and global forums. Not all institutes command sufficient material
and ideational resources.  Furthermore, there are often 'drag' factors that keep many
institutes primarily focused on national policy issues and domestic audiences.  Institutes
that operate in global arenas tend also to be elite, well-established and high profile bodies
in their national context.  The majority of institutes are not known beyond their national
borders and lack the size, stature, recognised experts and resources of mainstream
institutes based in OECD countries to sustain a presence beyond national borders.
Nevertheless, despite disparities in organisational capacities, the general trend is an
increasing diversity and depth to transnational activity among policy research institutes.
The Question of Influence
One  of  the  most  common  questions  associated  with  the  study  of  policy  research
organisations is how to determine their influence. There are no easy answers. Attempts to
measure this influence are plagued with methodological problems.  As a result there are
wild fluctuations in assessments of think tank powers and capacities. ‘Influence’ is a
word that is itself open to a variety of interpretations.  For scholars, the problem is
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complicated by the fact that think tanks often need to convince members, their donors
and benefactors, their media contacts and decision-makers of their influence, relevance or
importance.  As a result, these organisations often claim an influence over policy that is
inflated or unrealistic. Whilst some do have links into the policy formation processes and
have some kind of presence in the broader social-political system, their power or
influence is limited and dependent. Thus, it may be less the case that institutes have an
impact on government and more the case that governments or certain political leaders
employ these organisations as tools to pursue their own interests and provide intellectual
legitimation for policy.
As the politics and policy process in any country is invariably complicated, it is rare
to find uncontested examples of a one-to-one correspondence between a think tank report
and a policy adopted subsequently by government. Many are sceptical of think tanks
exerting direct impact on politics. Other observers, however, develop wider and more
nuanced understandings of policy research influence and social relevance.  For instance,
the intangible role of agenda-setting where policy experts and institutes create policy
narratives that seek to capture the political and public imagination. This ability to set the
terms of debate, define problems and shape policy perception has been described
elsewhere as ‘atmospheric’ influence (James, 2000: 163).
As  noted  earlier,  think  tanks  appear  to  be  useful  in  periods  of  critical  transition.   Such
transitions may occur with electoral change whereby an in-coming party requires
transition thinking in the form of policy ideas and blue-prints. 'Paradigm shift' represents
another form of transition (Hall, 1990).  Indeed, many of the Russian 'instituteniki' were
constitutive of changing policy orthodoxies that led to 'glasnost' and perestroika' in the
Soviet  Union.  The  manner  in  which  some  EU  institutes  contribute  to  a  specifically
European public debate and constructions of European identity, might have similar long
term impact.
Rather than identifying instances where policy research organisations have an
impact on the climate of opinion, or upon policy paradigms over the medium to long
term, or indeed, more direct and immediate impact on legislation, it may be more
appropriate to think about how these organisations are used as instruments.  On a day-to-
day basis, the frequent mode of institute activity is a low-key technical service role.  For
example, institutes provide services such as ethics training to government employees or
are commissioned to organise conferences and seminars. With official patronage, they
create channels of communication between formal and informal policy actors by starting
newsletters, compiling data-bases and building networks. They fulfil contracts to gather
and analyse information and are requested to monitor policy implementation.  In short,
many institutes are reactive to demand from governments and international organisations.
As such, rather than as agents of influence, many policy research organisations might be
better be viewed as ‘cogs’ in the administrative apparatus of the state or as ‘minor
functionaries’ in the EU system. This is an important counterfactual to keep in mind
when considering institute influence.
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We addresses three issues related to the impact of European think tanks on the
European policy process: 1) whether influence is direct or indirect; 2) the sources of
influence; and 3) areas where EU think tanks exhibit impact.
1. Direct or indirect influence? There is virtually unanimous agreement among
European think tank communities and constituents that to the extent to which influence
may be said to exist, it must be considered indirect.  The director of one Brussels-based
think tank admitted that: “Regarding influence, one can’t say that ‘x’ caused ‘y’.  There
could be 50 reasons why something happened.  All one can do [to determine influence] is
look back at previous papers and see if any valuable ideas came from them” (Interview.
London, February 2001.)
Many of those interviewed were of the view that judgment of the degree of think
tank influence required a period of at least two to three years between the development of
a specific idea and when it could be said to have been taken up by policy-makers.  To
compensate, one researcher pointed out that “Think tanks try to influence the climate of
opinion, rather than have a direct link [to policies]” (Interview. London.  February 2001).
2. Sources of Influence: The influence that European think tanks have on the EU
policy process derives from three interrelated sources:
? Authority based on expertise: As pointed out by a senior EU think tank staff
member, in order to have influence, think tanks “must have good
information, good statistics and good research” (Interview. Brussels.
January 2001).  Expertise may be in a specific issue area, such as possessed
by researchers in EU think tanks focusing on research and analysis and in
university-based research institutes.  However, in the case of the EU,
expertise may also be intimate knowledge of the EU policy process and/or
having access to the key policy actors.
? Promotion of an independent, balanced view: Preliminary research of the
views of EU policy-makers indicates that the outputs of EU-oriented think
tanks, particularly those operating in Brussels, are seen as credible sources
of information and policy advice due to their independence.  An official in a
European institution stated that some EU-oriented think tanks had “moral
authority” due to their independent status (Interview. Brussels. March
2001).
? Legitimacy: The issue of legitimacy largely stems from having recognized
authority.  Several European think tank researchers mentioned that their
legitimacy was strengthened by their need to defend their reputation.  The
expertise of researchers was also a factor in the existence of think tank
legitimacy.  Policy-makers focused on the unique features of some EU think
tanks noting their ability to bring a wide group of important policy actors
together as well as their strong track-record of addressing EU policy issues.
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3. The Impact of European Think Tanks on the EU Policy Process: The activities
of European, and specifically EU-oriented, think tanks have three types of impact on the
EU policy-making process:
? Serving as a forum for debate: Bringing European policy-makers together
through their forums was mentioned on numerous occasions by those
interviewed as one of key impacts European think tanks have on the EU
policy process. Through offering various policy actors, including civil
servants, politicians, academics, lobbyists and members of the interested
public a forum for debate allow for the sharing of ideas, broadening of
perspectives and the exchange of information.  An official in a European
institution exuberantly remarked: “Think tanks are an excellent forum for
discussion. Here they have influence!” (Interview. Brussels.  March 2001).
? Serving as a catalyst for debate: In addition to serving as a forum for debate,
European  think  tanks  can  also  have  an  impact  due  to  their  ability  to  be  a
catalyst for debate.  This stems from their analysis of policies, their
development of alternative ideas and providing relevant information.
Through proposing policy ideas and concepts, EU think tanks generate
debate, primarily in the agenda-setting stage, of the EU policy process.
? Developing medium-to-long-term ideas: Unlike policy-makers, particularly
those within government institutions, EU think tanks have the ability to
address long-term issues and overarching themes as well as those that others
may  at  first  dismiss  as  unrealistic.   An  observer  within  a  European
institution noted that “Think tanks think ahead with their proposals.  These
proposals may not be feasible, but [someone] must keep the fantasy”
(Interview. Brussels. January 2001). However, given its long-term nature,
the results of this impact may not be traceable to an individual think tank.
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Part Three: The Market for Research
Weaver and McGann argue that there are two distinct markets think tanks must
consider. The first is a market for funding while the second is that for policy advice
(2000: 13).  Although these two markets to overlap, for the most part they remain
separate.  These markets are driven by globalising and localizing forces operating in
unison.  In terms of global currents, Weaver and McGann state that major international
funding agencies are working beyond national borders. However, the authors note that at
the national or local level, state governments still play an important role in determining
the laws pertaining to funding (Weaver and McGann; 2000: 13).
Sources of Demand
In the main, government departments and agencies, national and local, are the main
sources of demand for policy research whether from independent institutes or internal
governmental think tanks.  However, increasingly demand for expert policy research is
expanding to other policy actors. Major consumers also include politicians, academics
(and their students) and the corporate sector (interview: London 27 March 2001).  Other
consumers are to be found among private actors in the media, law firms, NGO and
consultancy companies. They commission or otherwise support think tanks because they
provide useful resources. For instance, the media can find expert commentary from so-
called 'independent' and 'scholarly' think tanks. In a number of countries, the media has
developed an enormous appetite for think tank services. Mutually beneficial relationships
develop whereby think tanks represent an ‘expert’ source of information and commentary
for journalists who, in turn, play a key role in amplifying an institute’s reputation and
broadcasting their analyses.
Interest groups, trade unions, churches, NGOs and social movements can find
ideological succour or normative arguments to bolster their advocacy. Groups want ideas
fashioned  into  a  format  to  bolster  their  arguments  and  interests;  that  is,  in  a  simplified
palatable form that can be used to inform and mobilise their constituencies.  "Without
access to expertise (or counter expertise)..." non-governmental organisations "...cannot
effectively participate in the policy process" (Fischer, 1993: 36). By necessity, NGOs will
align themselves with certain think tanks or support the establishment of new think tanks
while corporations will fund institutes that concord with preferred policy perspectives.
Activist organisations like Greenpeace can draw upon the analysis of respected institutes
such  as  IIED,  the  Öko-Institute  or  Club  of  Rome  to  reinforce  its  own  research  or
advocacy on sustainable development.  Those who desire policy analysis that supports
the case for a free trading system are likely to find policy options and analyses of high
but accessible standard produced by organisations such as the Institute for Economic
Affairs in London or the Kiel Institute in Germany.
Further engagement between policy institutes and NGOs heralds two possible
developments in future.  First, NGOs may increasingly seek to develop in-house policy
research capacities. Indeed, this is a trend in the making in organisations like
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Transparency International.  Secondly, some private think tanks will become more like
NGOs or closely identified with specific NGOs.  In other words, NGO utilization think
tanks intellectual capacities may change not only how these organisations are perceived
but  also  how  they  undertake  policy  research  unless  there  are  other  sponsors/funding
sources who bring countervailing pressures.
Political parties have also established formal and informal ties with think tanks, not
only because they are a source of policy ideas and innovation, but also because think
tanks have intellectual authority that can be used to give established policy positions
additional credibility. The relationship between political parties and research institutes is
a highly formal one in Germany, and the Netherlands, but more distant in the UK where
charity and tax laws create incentives for formal or legal independence of institutes.
However, this does not preclude financial dependence.  The London based Overseas
Development Institute (ODI) is a good example.  A large, highly respected institute, it is
nevertheless overly dependent upon the UK Department for International Development
(DfID) for financial survival. However, DfID is not reliant upon ODI and commissions
research from a number of university research institutes from which ODI increasingly
faces stiff competition due to lower overheads and cross subsidisation within universities.
Needless to say, philanthropic foundations are an important source of demand.
Indeed, there is often considerable kudos for an institute if it wins a large grant from
international foundations such as Ford, Rockefeller and MacArthur in the USA,
Sasakawa in Japan, Nuffield in the UK or the Aga Khan Foundation. Foundation
executives and other sponsors have the ability to define what are emerging policy
agendas and to legitimate particular kinds of professional expertise (see Parmar, 2002).
This is potentially strengthened via co-financing large research initiatives (such as the
GDN) where foundation grant-giving is in conjunction with funding from government
development agencies and international organisations
The growth in think tanks, particularly in developing and transition economies,
has also been fuelled by funding from international agencies (such as the IMF),
developed country development agencies (for instance, USAID), and private foundations
(like the Soros Foundation) (Weaver and McGann; 2000: 16).  Although foreign funding
has in the past been both general as well project-specific, recently the trend has favoured
the latter (Weaver and McGann; 2000: 16).  At the same time, competition for funding
has intensified in the increasingly crowded policy research industry.
Sources of Funding and Financial Stability
The budgets of think tanks and policy institutes are generally a mixture of both
core and project funding.  Institutes in Western Europe “typically pursue a balanced
budget strategy, spending roughly as much as they receive in regular income. Bodies in
countries without government funding of think tanks try to build up financial reserves,
from bequests and special gifts” (Day; 2000: 126).  However, it is impossible to
generalise about the financial condition of policy institutes and think tanks throughout
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Europe. The only valid statement is that funding usually follows from the sources of
demand identified above.  However, one observer points out that
West European think tanks are not, for the most part, as well funded as
their US counterparts.  Finance from the ‘blue list’ of government approved
think tanks, a few German institutes have an annual income in excess of
US$10 million and therefore measure up to the better funded US think
tanks; but the West European median level is somewhere around $2 million,
and the average level significantly less than that (Day, 2000; 126).
In  Finland,  for  example,  there  is  a  very  small  think  tank  population  and  they  are  much
smaller than their German counterparts usually with fewer than ten semi-permanent staff
members and, in the main, subsidized by the government (Forsberg, 1999).
Even state funding does not come without some restrictions to their research and
operations. Existing legislation in many continental countries requires that they provide
independent and impartial and policy-related research. Additionally, the large state-
funded institutes are often obligated to be supervised by a board composed of a
combination of “government, academic and private-sector appointees, and run by a
director appointed by the board subject to government endorsement” (Day, 2000: 123).
A policy institute cannot recoup its costs from membership fees, sales of
publications or gifts. Philanthropy, corporate support and government contracts are
essential to survival (Stone; 1996: 53).  Given the financial constraints, think tanks have
developed  ways  to  stretch  their  budgets.   One  way that  think  tanks  may save  funds  on
activities is to ask for activities such as conferences to be hosted or co-sponsored by
embassies or ministries. (Interview; London: January 2003). The director of a London-
based think tanks noted that 90% of research and writing from people is pro bono
(Interview; London: 27 March 2001).  Occasionally, an institute might benefit from in-
kind support from companies such as provision of free or subsidised office space.
The financial health of a non-governmental institute can be affected by the tax
environment.  For example, in the past, the availability of generous state funding made up
for  the  relative  absence  of  a  strong  philanthropic  tradition  of  think  tank  funding  in
Germany.  However, as Germany has changed its foundation laws and thereby created
stronger tax incentives to establish philanthropic foundations, this might be changing in
future, albeit slowly (Thunert, 2003: 14). In the UK, funding is less of a tax issue. Funds
can be ‘gift-aided’ by corporations and other sponsors. According to Day:
In Britain, most think tanks are registered as educational charities and
therefore enjoy tax exemption on certain categories of incomes. The rather
imprecise British rules specify that organisations that seek to exert a direct
influence on government policy or to promote changes in the law cannot
normally be regarded as eligible for charitable status.  Think tanks registered
as charities are permitted by the Charity Commissioners to ‘influence
opinion on particular public issues which are directly relevant to their
objects’ and to publish research findings to that end; but they must not
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advocate  a  particular  line  of  policy  or  legislative  change  if  they  wish  to
retain the tax benefits of charitable status (Day, 2000: 124).
For the majority of Western European think tanks, the state remains the most
important source of funding.  The exception is the UK where think tanks do not receive
core funding from the government (Day; 2000: 125-126). Within the EU, the
Commission is increasingly a source of income. In the case of the handful of EU think
tanks  in  Brussels  that  receive  no  state  funding,  the  Commission  is  a  key  source  of
funding, contributing approximately Euro 125,000 per annum (Interview; Brussels: 30
January 2001).
In addition to a separate budget line for think tanks funding, various funding
programmes exist within the EU that are open to proposals from think tanks. The EU’s
Sixth Framework Programme (FP6) is one of the largest sources of funding for
organisations within the EU, as well as increasingly for candidate countries. In November
2002, the first calls for tender were made under this programme with deadlines beginning
in March 2003. Similar to the earlier Fifth Framework Programme, the major themes
under which projects could be submitted include a mixture of social and natural sciences.
(htttp://www.cordis.lu/fp6/activities-print.htm). One of the objectives of the FP6
programme is to promote cooperation among European organisations.  Of the three new
instruments with which successful projects will be implemented, two focus on multi-
partner proposals. The “Networks of Excellence” consists of:
Multipartner  projects  aimed  at  strengthening  excellence  on  a  research  topic
by networking the critical mass of resources of expertise. This expertise will
be networked around a joint programme of activities aimed primarily at
creating a progressive and lasting integration of the research activities of the
network partners while, at the same time advancing knowledge on the topic
(htttp://www.cordis.lu/fp6/activities-print.htm).
FP6 projects are intended to include between 3 to 5 project partners but can be much
larger collaborative exercises. Although primarily intended for organisations in current
EU Member States, projects that include partners from candidate countries are strongly
encouraged. These networks and projects will play a major role in defining the future
European ‘research space’.
Given the limited funding available, many European institutes are experiencing
financial  constraints  that  affect  their  activities.  In  the  view  of  one  London  based  think
tank researcher, the reasons for financial constraints are three-fold:
1. There is a global recession
2. There are so many institutes/think tanks, their work has become a public good
– businesses and other potential sponsors frequently wish to make use of work
done but do not necessarily see a sufficient interest to wish to pay;
3. Increased competition from university research institutes who frequently
undertake the sort of policy-oriented research that was traditionally based in
think tanks.
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(Interview with Julie Smith, Chatham House, London, January 2003).
In the case of the Brussels-based EU think tanks, this situation stems from the fact
that  they  do  not  have  access  to  member  state  sources  of  funding.   However,  most
Brussels-based EU think tanks do receive funding from the European Commission.
Throughout the EU, financial necessities have increased the reliance of EU think tanks on
membership dues and contributions.
This is compounded by the shift in the form of both governmental and foundation
grants over the past four decades. Large capital funding was often associated with the
establishment of many of the first wave and second wave institutes. A significant
proportion of the older independent institutes have endowments, own a building, and
were able to build a strong capacity and large in-house staff due to the willingness of
foundations or governments to support longer term research programmes. In Germany
during the 1990s, some operating as well as grant-giving foundations such as the German
Marshall Fund and a number of smaller foundations began shifting their funding
priorities from basic academic research to applied and policy-related work (Thunert,
2003: 14). Today, shorter-term project funding is more prevalent which hits hard on
independent think tanks that must engage in a constant round of grant applications in
order to survive. It is brings pressures on institutes to be leaner and smaller, with greater
reliance on short-term contract researchers.
There are dilemmas common to both domestic and foreign funding.  According to
Julie Smith, Director of the European Programme at Chatham House, these include:
1) Conflict of interest: There is the question of ‘Who do we take money
from’.  Sometimes there are conflicts of interest.
2) Research agenda objectivity: There is a risk that the research agenda can
be skewed, especially with project-specific funding.
3) Undue influence: The research results may be unduly influenced by the
needs of the funding source.  However, if there is a significantly good
funding portfolio, then any one source of funding (i.e, corporations vs.
government vs. members) is less likely to have excessive influence.
4) Independence: If funding is general in scope rather than project specific,
there is less of a possibility that a think tank’s independence would be
compromised. (Interview; London: January 2003)
There are also dilemmas specific to foreign funding.  Weaver and McGann (2000)
note the existence of a “weaning” problem that may emerge if a think tank depends
overly on foreign funding at the expense of developing domestic sources of funding (17).
This could result in the think tank experiencing severe financial problems if the foreign
funder shifts its focus to another geographical or policy.  An extreme example of this is
the Brussels-based Philip Morris Institute in operation from 1991 until a few years ago
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when a change of management at the Philip Morris headquarters in the US led to its
demise.  Its former director, Giles Merritt, founded Friends of Europe based on a broader
source of funding.
Some sources of funding are perceived to be ‘cleaner’ or more desirable than
others.  However, such perceptions vary from country to country. In Germany, to be a
‘Blue List’ institute that receives federal funding is prestigious.  In other political
cultures, there can be some suspicion that government funded institutes are compromised.
As an official in an EU institution noted, “The lack of  party affiliation of Brussels’ think
tanks (make their information useful)” (Interview, Brussels: 26 March 2001).
Accountability and Transparency
Over the last decade, there have been numerous developments in Information
Communication Technology (ICT).  Perhaps the most significant in terms of increasing
the ease, volume and speed of information exchange have been the internet that allows
communication via e-mail and online forums, as well as the World Wide Web that
facilitates document exchange and the transference of images.  The benefits of ICT over
conventional forms of communication technology include cost-effectiveness, interactivity
and the ability to rapidly exchange large amounts of information (O’Neill; 2000: 194).
For think tanks, use of the internet has both widened and deepened debate as well
as made it more transparent. The internet has been revolutionary for think tanks.  This is
specifically due to two advantages offered by the internet: 1) The ability to advertise and
promote activities. Think thanks can make their presence known through their website; 2)
Think tanks can continuously update their material. This can’t be done with traditional
publication methods. (Interview; London: 27 February 2001).
The extent of outreach a website can generate is potentially enormous. A
Brussels-based think tank researcher noted that his institute’s website generates between
400,000 and 450,000 hits per month. Half come from the US.   This staff member was of
the  opinion  that  “The  future  will  see  an  increase  in  the  digital  elements  of
communication…The electronic dimension is increasing in importance and may bring
about virtual think tanks” (Interview; Brussels: 31 January 2001).  The use of ICT offers
European think tanks vast opportunities to improve their presence within the EU policy
process,  both  through  the  use  of  a  website  as  well  as  through  the  use  of  electronic
mailings lists.  To spread their information as far as possible, think tanks, particularly
those with an international focus, are increasingly providing multi-lingual websites and
developing innovative modes of e-membership.
In short, the research, publication and advocacy of think tanks and policy institutes
is becoming much more visible and accessible to interested members of the general
public. Even so, institutes are largely unknown to the public. Whilst transparency and
accessibility can be seen as a positive development – for the returns to both institutes and
their audiences – questions of accountability and democratic participation are very rarely
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directed at these bodies.  There is a lack of systematic scrutiny (Kim & Mauborgne,
2001).
For government created and funded institutes that are part of the state
architecture, there are established bureaucratic procedures of review and lines of
accountability.  The situation is less clear in relation to the non-profit independent think
tanks. At one level they are accountable to their donors and sponsors.  In another sense,
they might be accountable to a membership body. Or in another way, there is
accountability to scientific norms and professional standards where preservation of
scholarly reputation is important for the public profile and credibility of an institute. In
part, the publication of annual reports and holding meetings open to the public represent
mechanisms of public review for those institutes that may be in receipt of public funds.
It is not uncommon to hear the argument that institutes contribute to the plurality
of public debate. That is, “there are a large variety of think tanks so there are many
different views” (Interview; London: January 2003). And as independent institutes, they
act in the public interest.  The vast majority of EU think tanks claim that despite
foundation, corporate or government sponsorship their views remain independent. Day
argues that:
The evidence in western Europe suggests not only that publicly
funded think tanks (including party-linked institutes) operate independently
in accordance with their statutes, but also that reliance on corporate funding
does not result in any slavish adoption of corporate policy agendas, even by
advocacy think tanks sympathetic to corporate objectives. Many free market
institutes, for example, have received substantial donations from private-
sector companies broadly in favor of the free market message, but all insist
credibly that such funding in way constrains their freedom to set their own
policy agendas (Day 2000:124).
However, most policy institutes are run by an intellectual elite, speak to a small,
politically educated audience, and have small membership bodies or none at all.  It could
be argued that the citizenry of European nations are marginalised from policy debate by
the  proliferation  of  think  tanks.  As  noted  earlier  in  a  different  context:  “A plenitude  of
information leads to a poverty of attention” (Keohane and Nye 1998, 89). By and large,
European publics are passive recipients of pronouncements that trickle down from
experts in think tanks via the media. Think tanks do not necessarily represent a
democratisation of opinion.
As argued earlier, an institute’s participation in global policy networks is
dependent on substantial resources and contacts. A question about ‘inclusiveness’ in both
national and transnational policy communities is their club-like and elite character.
Involvement is usually limited to recognised stakeholders and experts in the policy field.
Participation is informally restricted and regulated by the network to exclude minority or
protest knowledge.
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Networks are porous and do present opportunities of informal participation in
decision-making.   Yet, policy networks can also prevent the emergence of challenges to
the dominant values or interests in society suppressing or thwarting demands for change
in the existing allocation of benefit and privilege in society.  Networks undermine
‘political responsibility by shutting out the public’ (Rhodes & Marsh, 1992: 200).
Institutional procedures entail that the system responds better towards the well-organised,
wealthy, skilled and knowledgeable rather than to unconnected, poorly financed,
unskilled research groups. In sum, the technocratic policy expertise of academics, think
tanks  and  other  experts  needs  to  be  addressed  in  terms  of  their  alignment  with  the
interests of political and economic elites whereby they may become key actors in wider
societal struggles to control the terms of political debate.
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